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Queer Immanence in Who is? Woyzeck: 
The Technocentric Utopia of the Master and the Slave
There is no one more inveterate or thorough in damaging freedom than liberal 
institutions (Nietzsche, 1998, p. 68).
The German Völkerkörper [people’s body], which was filled to the brim, couldn’t 
live without evacuating its purulent flesh. Perhaps for this reason, another of 
the German doctors defined Auschwitz as anus mundi, anus of the world 
(Esposito, 2008, p. 143).
Queerness is not yet here. Queerness is an ideality. Put another way, we are 
not yet queer. We may never touch queerness, but we can feel it as the warm 
illumination of a horizon imbued with potentiality. We have never been queer, 
yet queerness exists for us as an ideality that can be distilled from the past and 
used to imagine a future. The future is queerness’s domain (Muñoz, 2009, p. 1).
I
Büchner’s Woyzeck is probably one of the most famous pieces in the history 
of Western theatre and drama. It was probably written in 1836 as a couple of 
versions of an unfinished manuscript, with some differences in the number 
of scenes and their structure throughout the play. These twenty­seven loosely 
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interconnected scenes were published in 1878 under the false and unprecise 
title of Wozzeck as a provocative anticipation of expressionist and naturalist 
dramaturgy. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, this text has become 
a challenge for any deeper philological and dramaturgical analysis, but it has 
also earned the status of one of the most influential German proto­modernist 
theatre pieces. Furthermore, it has become interesting for the general pub­
lic – even for non­theatre goers – solely because it was based on a criminal 
investigation during the 1820s of a psychotic figure named Woyzeck who 
killed his lover in a cold­blooded manner. Crime of passion was suddenly 
implemented in a legal procedure, with all its controversies, dismantled not 
only as a juridical category but also as a psychological phenomenon. As a tragic 
working­class hero, Woyzeck is an experiment of the system that dialectically 
emerged in an even wider social experiment of obedience and exploitation on 
one hand and limited freedom and ethical responsibility on the other. His pre­
carious nature is, thus, a pure reflection of the system’s hypocrisies, dismantled 
in a figure of a circus employee, and a cynical comment of a dominant rational 
philosophical dispositive.
Although these dramaturgical and philosophical elements of the play 
deserve to be analyzed more deeply, here I would like to focus more on the per­
formative potentiality of Woyzeck’s intertext (in Agamben’s sense of the word) 
as something that offers an opening but is not quite there yet – as an interpre­
tative network that calls upon a theoretical framework rather than offering 
it as a reading automaton. Therefore, Montažstroj’s performance of Georg 
Büchner’s play will broadcast this kind of potentiality for me, mainly because 
of its theoretical background in the political, as an ontic dimension that per­
verts the habitual analysis of any performance stratum.
Montažstroj’s1 performance was entitled Who is? Woyzeck, and it was 
supposed to function as a tragic history about individuals’ open wounds 
that will never heal, especially in the context of technodemocracy or liberal 
deprivation processes. Woyzeck was, therefore, transformed into a perversion 
of a tragic hero whose voice cannot be heard. As he was deprived, deprivi­
leged, and socially unacceptable, Woyzeck soon became a symbolic devoid 
1 Montažstroj is a Croatian interdisciplinary performance art group established in 1989 
by Borut Šeparović. Their performative practice is oriented towards interventions in the pub­
lic sphere, political theatre, physical and immersive performance practices, etc. Since their 
establishment they have produced more than one hundred theater and performance works 
in all aesthetic regimes and production environments.
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of humanity, at first turned into an animal, pure zoe, and thus treated like 
one by the system. Nevertheless, Montažstroj’s project was eager to explore 
the politics of power in which the individual is subdued by numerous forms of 
violence and the way it resonates in human intimacy. The rhythmic changing 
of scenes depicting social coercion and private agony was supposed to ques­
tion the world of isolated and lonely individuals. Woyzeck was presented as 
a pure phenomenon – as an in-dividual – trapped in a Hegelian master­slave 
relation, thus as a non­person in a specific situation of desire, violence, love, 
betrayal, jealousy and murder, with no way out. This performance of two men 
and a woman on a stage – bombarded with techno and rave music – together 
with pure channels of associations derived from various sources (not only but 
primarily from Büchner's text) functioned as a deconstructive and multi­layered 
re­inscription of the political and discursive regimes deprived to frenetic music 
samples. Büchner’s dramaturgical impetum and textual fragmentation was, 
therefore, not conceived but revealed as a constitutive element of the performa­
tive interpretation. Resonances of music, embodiment, the vocal expressions 
of the three performers, as well as the author’s fragmented scenes, reemerged 
as a vital force in a deconstructive network of meaning that is eager to become 
a political symbol of deprivation. This symbolism was again craving for its lost 
meaning in the sphere of the political. Montažstroj’s performance piece, as well 
as Bucher’s play, immediately calls upon the Hegelian notion of the master and 
the slave, lordship and bondage, mastery and servitude. Nevertheless, before 
evoking his dialectics, let me propose a biopolitical axis that might lie behind 
this play, as well as it is implemented in the core of the group’s interpretation 
of Büchner’s text. Concepts of biopower and biopolitics are arguably the most 
compelling concepts in Foucault’s theoretical heritage, although these refer­
ences remain highly speculative and incomplete, or sometimes even incoherent. 
But if biopolitics can be understood as a kind of political rationality that deals 
with concepts of life, introducing biopower as a transformative mechanism 
of power, then subordination strategies, subjection and control are means of 
biopolitics sui generis. The judicial discourse that strikes upon individuals like 
Woyzeck is, of course, a repressive, oppressive and negative one, but it also 
coordinates itself with a life’s bare positivity; as a mechanism of power, it puts 
Büchner’s main character in a framework of medicine, scientific rationality, 
experiment, medical statistics, health improvement policies, etc. Capitalist 
governmentality exposes its mechanisms through the “positive” capacities of 
“the political” – through its interventions inside the sphere of bios. Archeology 
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of biopower is simple enough and has its starting point (as Foucault emphasizes 
several times) in Schmittian views on decisionism as a determinant factor of 
sovereignty, whereby the sovereign decides upon life and death, not without 
an exception but inside of the systematic perversion of the exception. During 
the seventeenth century this notion of decisionist power structures began to 
change, finally integrating the political in a more complex discursive mecha­
nism, a dual structure, not antithetic, with a disciplinary power on one hand, 
embodied in an imprisonment, as well as in a dichotomy between discipline 
and punishment, and
the second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued 
with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propa­
gation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with 
all the conditions that can cause this to vary. Their supervision was effected through 
an entire series of intervention and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the popula­
tion (Foucault, 1978, p. 139).
It is important to say that both of these intrinsic modes of power rely on 
the concept of servitude and enslavement, depicted either by notions of subjec­
tification and disciplinarity or, in a biopolitical sense, the notion of a regula­
tory subjugation. A well­known mechanism of modern power was, in a way, 
already on the horizon as an indispensable element for the development of 
docile labor embodiment, neoliberal economy and modern forms of capitalism. 
State­produced stereotypes and government­supported inclusion­exclusion 
parameter(s) function as an essential mechanism of the modern biopolitical 
state apparatus. Michel Foucault’s notions of biopower and biopolitics were 
interpreted in many ways and criticized due to their inconsistencies. One of 
the most appealing reinterpretations of the intersections of life, body and 
politics – at least in the context of the proposed analysis of Montažstroj’s 
performance – can be found in Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical thought, 
especially in The Use of Bodies (Agamben, 2016). There he emphasizes that 
the expression ‘the use of the body’ can already be found at the beginning 
of Aristotle’s Politics,
at the point where it is a question of defining the nature of the slave [sic!]. Aristotle 
has just affirmed that the city is composed of families or households (oikiai) and 
that the family, in its perfect form, is composed of slaves and free people (ek doulon 
kai eleutheron – the slaves are mentioned before the free; 1253b 3–5). Three types 
of relations define the family: the despotic (despotikè) relation between the master 
(despotes) and the slaves, the matrimonial (gamikè) relation between the husband 
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and wife, and the parental (technopoietikè) relation between the father and the chil­
dren (7–11). That the master/slave relation is in some way, if not the most important, 
at least the most evident is suggested – aside from its being named first – by the fact 
that Aristotle specifies that the latter two relations are ‘nameless’, lacking a proper 
name (which seems to imply that the adjectives gamikè and technopoietikè are only 
improper denominations devised by Aristotle, while everyone knows what a ‘despotic’ 
relation is) (Agamben, 2016, p. 3).
Furthermore, being a slave is defined in a negative way, depicting its 
otherness, while being human is always defined by its nature of another and 
not of itself. Relying on a Platonic tradition, according to Agamben, Aristotle 
was eager to manifest domination of the master over the slave through that of 
the soul over the body. But, the relation proposed by a Greek philosopher is not 
defined in a political context. Its semantics should be traced in the context of 
a genuine oikia, a household where, at least “according to the clear distinction 
that separates the household (oikia) from the city (polis) […], a relationship 
soul/body (like master/slave) is an economic­domestic relationship and not 
a political one” (Agamben, 2016, p. 4). Exactly at that point and out of that 
context the Aristotelian definition of a slave emerges as a being whose work 
is the use of the body. As his ergon is not entirely human or properly human, 
although being human, a slave functions as a
human being who is not of himself but of another […], that is to say, it is a matter 
of establishing whether there exists in nature a body corresponding to the definition 
of the slave. Thus, the inquiry is not dialectical but physical, in the sense in which 
Aristotle distinguishes in On the Soul (403a 29) the method of a dialectic, which 
defines, for example, anger as a desire for vengeance, from that of physics, which 
will see in it only a boiling of blood in the hearth” (Agamben, 2016, p. 8).
The body of a slave, thus, has a pure physical form in strength for a necessary 
use or service, if not for servitude. Aristotle will, therefore, introduce a useful 
comparison between a slave and ktemata, a tool, and the instruments (organa), 
in order to conclude – according to Agamben – that slaves can be appropri­
ated as animated equipment (ktema ti empsychon). This living instrument, 
an automaton, can easily be implemented in Foucauldian notions of biopoliti­
cal regulatory or control mechanisms, although, as emphasized by Agamben, 
“a first, necessary precaution is therefore that of abstracting the slave’s ‘use of 
the body’ from the sphere of poiesis and production, in order to restore it to 
the sphere – according to Aristotle by definition unproductive – of praxis and 
mode of life” (Agamben, 2016, p. 12).
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Total assimilation of a slave, firstly in the sphere of the household, then in 
the sphere of praxis, allows Agamben to imply that a slave is not to be consid­
ered as only a slave, but as a part of his own entity, and a part of his own body. 
“The slave is a part (of the body) of the master, in the ‘organic’ and not simply 
instrumental sense of the term, to such an extent that Aristotle can speak of 
a ‘community of life’ between slave and master (koinonos zoes; 1260a 40)” 
(Agamben, 2016, p. 13). Praxis of the slave, at least I think so, can be defined 
as a pure usage of one’s body, as an embodiment per se, and not as productive 
labor or work.
Agamben’s master­slave dialectics is deeply interwoven with his own phi­
losophy of potentiality, where a figure of a slave functions as something repressed 
in Western bios, and “the reemergence of the figure of the slave in the mod­
ern worker thus appears, according to the Freudian scheme, as a return of 
the repressed in a pathological form” (Agamben, 2016, p. 21). The indefinable 
position between bios and zoe, between the economy and politics, between 
physis and nomos, at least in my opinion, opens a possibility for a performa­
tive interpretation of both mastery and servitude. The slave can easily end up 
in a position of mastery, as in a perverse (sado)masochistic phantasy, whereby 
role­playing encourages submission and repression. Or, to put it in Foucault’s 
terms, sadomasochism is the core­structure of subjectification; it is a linguistic 
and discursive game with reciprocal transformation of subjects into the sub­
jected, desire into labor, and vice versa. The most quoted definition of sado­
masochism’s fluidifying strength over power relations appears in an interview 
from 1982, where Foucault declares that
S&M is the eroticization of power, the eroticization of strategic relations. What 
strikes me with regard to S&M is how it differs from social power. What charac­
terizes power is the fact that it is a strategic relationship which has been stabilized 
through institutions […] At this point, the S&M game is very interesting because 
it is a strategic relation, but it is always fluid. Of course, there are roles, but everyone 
knows very well that those roles can be reversed. Sometimes the scene begins with 
the master and slave, and at the end the slave has become the master. Or, even when 
the roles are stabilized, you know very well that it is always a game. Either the rules 
are transgressed, or there is an agreement, either explicit or tacit, that makes them 
aware of certain boundaries (Foucault, 1997, p. 169).
So, there is a kind of (bio)technology in the deep structure of the enslave­
ment procedure which is relatively unstable and hard to grasp. Agamben 
underlines the fact that the economization of manual labor and emergence 
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of technology can easily be explained inside of the master­slave paradigm. 
The symmetry between the slave and the machine in Greek society was so 
evident that there was indeed no need for any pre­technological develop­
ment. A slave is not a machine, although some of the machine’s functions 
resonate inside of the master­slave paradigm. Montažstroj’s performance, 
as I will insist, reflects upon this problematic or subtle difference between 
slaves’ bodies as, first, human­animals or animal­humans and, secondly, 
as living instruments and instruments of life. This can be summarized 
in the following manner:
That is to say, the slave constitutes in the history of anthropogenesis a double thresh­
old in which animal life crosses over to the human just as the living (the human) 
crosses over into the inorganic (into the instrument), and vice versa. The invention 
of slavery as a juridical institution [as depicted by Foucault, for example] allowed 
the capture of living beings and of the use of the body into productive systems, tem­
porarily blocking the development of the technological instrument; its abolition in 
modernity freed up the possibility of technology, that is, of the living instrument […] 
Insofar as they have lost, together with the use of bodies, their immediate relation to 
their own animality – modern human beings have not truly been able to appropriate 
to themselves the liberation from labor that machines should have procured for them. 
And if the hypothesis of a constitutive connection between slavery and technology 
is correct, it is not surprising that the hypertrophy of technological apparatuses has 
ended up producing a new and unheard­of form of slavery (Agamben, 2016, p. 79).
Mechanization of a slave is not merely an instrumentalization proce­
dure. It encompasses a much deeper and more complex dialectics in which 
the master–slave relationship is reflected­upon internally from the position 
of the system itself. Agamben’s notions of enslavement should be interpreted 
in the context of his homo sacer project, in which the following hypotheses 
emerge: first, the state of exception, as a zone of separation between inside and 
outside, inclusion and exclusion, sovereignty and submission; second, sovereign 
is the one that produces bare life as an original social and political element, 
articulated in between nature on one hand and culture on the other, between 
zoe and bios; the third fundamental biopolitical paradigm is, predominantly, 
in charge of subduing bare life to zoe­like entity, like the one of the concentra­
tion camp. Therefore, the ban encompasses bare life and sovereignty, creating 
an explicit extraneousness, an idea of an uninscribable exteriority: “Sovereign 
violence is in truth founded not on a pact but on the exclusive inclusion of bare 
life in the state” (Agamben, 1998, p. 107; for a critical account of Agamben’s 
thesis see Laclau, 2014, pp. 207–220).
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The technocentric utopia of Montažstroj’s project relies exactly on this 
incoherence between bios that pre­includes zoe, mastery including enslave­
ment, or inconsistencies inside of a system that creates mastery on one hand 
and servitude on the other. Woyzeck behaves as a machine, as a biomechanical 
apparatus, not in order to create the illusion of its own servitude habitus, but 
to re­perform the crack between different forms of slavery inside of the neo­
liberal and capitalist matrix. He is that no-thing of the communitas, asserted 
by Esposito, not in a sense of pure and deliberative negation of the identity, 
nor in the context of a concealing one, but, moreover, in a sense of belonging 
to a wider community that is also not an entity:
nor is it a collective subject, nor a totality of subjects, but rather is the relation that 
makes them no longer individual subjects because it closes them off from their iden­
tity with a line, which traversing them, alters them: it is the ‘with’, the ‘between’, and 
the threshold where they meet in a point of contact that brings them into relation with 
others to the degree to which it separates them from themselves (Esposito, 2010, p. 139).
Woyzeck is surrounded by a pure form of nihilism, which is the sup­
pression of the no-thing-in-common, “a nothing squared: nothing multiplied 
and simultaneously swallowed by nothing” (Esposito, 2010, p. 140). Indeed, 
in Büchner’s play as well as in Montažstroj’s performance, a tragic hero func­
tions as a prosthesis, a social void or a non­organ – a non­existing­organ that 
ought to be removed from the living segment of the body in order to amplify 
it, outline its inherent life­border, delineate it as something-still-alive.
II
The phenomenon of a machine that is touched upon here is of utmost 
importance for the interpretation of a master narrative, but also for the analy­
sis of the uncanny effect that Woyzeck’s particle­entity evokes in a play – and 
especially in Montažstroj’s performance. Let me shortly approach the uncanny 
effect from Roberto Esposito’s biopolitical standpoint before tracing it back to 
Freud. In two of his recent accounts on the problems of communitas, Esposito 
invests a lot of effort in tracing a Heideggerian notion of life which is subordi­
nated to a machine, thus constructed by life itself, to a broader political sphere:
To begin with, it must be noted that the first role of machination is to hide what it 
produces. Instead of referring to ‘disenchantment’, machination actually has more 
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to with an opposite effect of ‘enchantment’ [which, relying on Heidegger, often] 
comes from ‘the unbridled dominance of machination. When machination attains 
ultimate dominance, when it pervades everything, then there are no more circum­
stances whereby the bewitchery can be sensed explicitly and resisted’ […] The fact 
that machination ‘bewitches’ means not only that it produces enchantment, but at 
the same time it conceals the original link that unites enchantment to disenchant­
ment, tying them together in a metaphysical bond (Esposito, 2015, p. 26).
Even if the possibility of turning them off exists, they are, nevertheless, 
closely connected with the apparatuses, whit the sphere of political, which 
influence our own possibility to turn them off. The link between subjectiv­
ity and subjugation, therefore, puts the notion of life (human) in an awkward 
position of a fluid or even masterless mastership. Machination of Woyzeck’s 
responses to bare life ought to be interpreted not in the context of his servitude, 
his fear of death, but of a death, or even death’s return – usually in a form of 
uncanniness. This fear is, above all, a common fear, or even a communal fear, 
but moreover, a reciprocal fear of the natural state:
This explains, therefore, the otherwise paradoxical birth of law and morality from 
the most illegitimate and immoral act, but nevertheless always ‘sacred’ (as every ritual 
sacrifice is etymologically ‘sacred’): [that of the very] ‘recognition of mutual obliga-
tions; institutions declared sacred, which could not be broken" (Esposito, 2010, p. 37).
Clearly, the politics of life always risks being reversed into a work of death. 
In the first volume of the History of Sexuality Michel Foucault is already asser­
tive: “One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, 1978, 
p. 138). Thus, new concepts of a biopolitical sovereignty and slavery emerge 
from these Foucaultian notions, where the concept of slave is not the one 
conferring significance on that of the free man, the master, the lord, but 
the other way around. “And, as has repeatedly been brought to light, this 
relation is inverted in the modern period, when it begins to assume increas­
ingly the features of a so­called negative liberty, with respect to that defined 
instead as ‘positive’, as in ‘freedom from’” (Esposito, 2008, p. 70). In order 
to ensure freedom, by all means, liberal societies obscure it by setting rules, 
norms, procedures and obligations, usually in an abstract form of political 
framework. There is always that uncanny presence of a machine, an institu­
tion, or another lifeless entity present – to control bare life. In Freud’s text, 
published in 1919, uncanniness is not always used in a clearly definable and 
precise sense, because the author is more eager to show how it tends to coin­
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cide with whatever excites the dread. Freud insists that the word unheimlich 
should not be interpreted as something frightening, only because it is strange 
and therefore unfamiliar. Instead, he proposes an ambivalent meaning which 
coincides and presupposes its opposite, Heimlich or the canny. Its notion 
is situated in a vague area, betwixt­and­between of an apparently animate 
being on one hand, real liveness, and, conversely, a lifeless object, an automa­
ton or appearance, with a peculiar emotional effect of the thing. Woyzeck 
is precisely a derivation of the thing, a victim of social and economic forces, 
patronized by a figure of a captain he shaves, being told that he lacks morals 
because of his illegitimate child, treated as an experiment by a military doc­
tor, desperately poor, etc. Abolishing the hierarchy of suffering, as it has been 
often stated, Woyzeck is left with a mute soul, an unlively one, predicted to be 
and to function just as an experiment. This transformation, him becoming 
a pure lusus naturae, actually evokes an uncanny effect. In Montažstroj’s ver­
sion, therefore, he needs to be amplified, even doubled, because in Freudian 
terms precisely this other­that­is­not­the­other, a double, was originally sup­
posed to be an insurance against destruction of the ego, denial of the power 
of death, an immortal embodied Doppelgänger which preserves the original’s 
bios. Nevertheless, recurrences of the same entity or the same situation often 
led to terror, a demonic repetition, suddenly attributed to the uncanny other­
ness. Or, in Freud’s words:
This is the place now to put forward two considerations which, I think, contain 
the gist of this short study. In the first place, if psychoanalytic theory is correct in 
maintaining that every emotional effect, whatever its quality, is transformed by repres­
sion into morbid anxiety, then among such cases of anxiety there must be a class 
in which the anxiety can be shown to come from something repressed which recurs. 
This class of morbid anxiety would then be no other than what is uncanny, irrespec­
tive of whether it originally aroused dread or some other affect. In the second place, 
if this is indeed the secret nature of the uncanny, we can understand why the usage of 
speech has extended das Heimliche into its opposite das Unheimliche; for this uncanny 
is in reality nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old – established in 
the mind that has been estranged only by the process of repression. This reference to 
the factor of repression enables us, furthermore, to understand [Friedrich] Schelling’s 
definition of the uncanny as something which ought to have been kept concealed 
but which has nevertheless come to light (Freud, 1955, pp. 12–13).
Woyzeck’s uncanny presence on the stage surely interacts with its bonds­
man’s identity, if not total deprivation and servitude. But, as I mentioned before, 
leaning on a biopolitical paradigm, his servitude also includes a community 
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of life which is underlined in a most convincing way by Montažstroj’s perfor­
mance. It is as though a pure Hegelian notion was called upon the stage.
Hegel discusses the notion of consciousness in general but is willing 
to define it in a more coherent way in relation to the subjectivity. Thus, 
he takes the idea to the next level, asserting that self­consciousness presumes 
subjects being also objects to other subjects, or – to put it in more Hegelian 
terms – self­consciousness is exactly the awareness of another’s awareness of 
oneself. A struggle for recognition, deeply implied in the self­consciousness 
formation processes, emerges at the point where the self and the other come 
together, which makes self­consciousness possible, and, on the other hand, 
in the moment when one becomes conscious of the otherness­effect, either 
vis­à­vis others or oneself, precisely in the zone of differentiation. This zone 
is, therefore, a place of in-difference where individuals are paradoxically seek­
ing equality and hegemony, relationship and independence, all at the same 
time. One presumes the role of a bondsman, the other of the servant, whereby 
the master and slave dichotomy is established. Although the slave is deeply 
dependent upon the master he nevertheless reflects the lord’s desire to assert 
his own pure consciousness. He is perfectly aware that from the lord’s position, 
he is only a thing, rather than a self­aware being, thus reflecting his otherness. 
The master, the lord, occupies a position of the dominant’s pure enjoyment, 
while the slave continues to reflect on his status of a subordinated other­
ness. However, the position of lordship is also not completely satisfying – not 
without a reflection­effect. In negating his own consciousness, in turning 
the slave into an object unessential to his own self­consciousness, he is not 
able to establish a relation of recognition for himself and for his bondsman, 
who is thus able to find his satisfaction in a labor­process, transforming 
objects, and therefore claiming a mind of his own (Hegel, 1977, pp. 104–138). 
This Hegelian dialectic suggests a certain type of coherence between concrete 
and abstract, subject and object, partiality and wholeness – according to 
him, both master and slave recognize their own existence only in a relation 
or even some kind of reconciliation of the otherness, participating in each 
other’s power formations.
Although some postcolonial critics have successfully shown that it is 
absolutely possible to show how the master laughs at the slave’s consciousness 
(“I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master 
described by Hegel. For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs 
at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not rec­
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ognition but work” (Fanon, 1967, p. 220)). In this analysis of Montažstroj’s 
performance I will stick to the previously constructed dialectics where “man 
is never simply man. He is always, necessarily, and essentially, either Mas­
ter or Slave” (Kojève, 1980, p. 8)2. Büchner’s play is probably one of the first 
working­class tragedies, but it also opens a space for a non­dialectical inter­
pretation of the main character. In the original text, but in Montažstroj’s 
performance as well, a pessimistic future of the world was shown. Different 
conceptions of slavery, whether to a single master, godlike figure, or a capital, 
eliminate every possibility of equality and freedom – but also a possibility of 
jouissance. Mastery will be eliminated in a utopian paradigm of slave­citizen 
transformation, whereby the future belongs to labor or to laborious enslave­
ment in constant search for recognition. These pseudo­Marxist and Kojève­
like interpretations open a space for understanding Büchner’s text in all its 
inconsistencies, fragmentation and uncanniness. Furthermore, they call upon 
the biopolitical paradigm of analysis, which is also pre­existent in Hegel, 
opening itself to notions, already introduced here – relying on Agamben – of 
the community of life. At one point, Hegel emphasizes:
Self­consciousness is, to begin with, simple being­for­self, self­equal through the exclu­
sion from itself of everything else. For it, its essence and absolute object is ‘I’; and in 
this immediacy, or in this [mere] being, of its being­for­self, it is an individual [sic!]. 
What is ‘other’ for it is an unessential, negatively characterized object. But the ‘other’ 
is also a self­consciousness; one individual is confronted by another individual. 
Appearing thus immediately on the scene, they are for one another like ordinary 
objects, independent shapes, individuals submerged in the being [or immediacy] of 
Life – for the object in its immediacy is here determined as Life (Hegel, 1977, p. 113).
The notion of an individual or a person is presumably one of the key notions 
of modern democracy. Political organizations, as it is often claimed, depend 
“not on the voluntary and rational choice of individuals united in a foundation 
pact, but on the inextricable knot of strengths and instincts that are innervated 
in the individual body, and even more in the ethnically determined traits of 
different populations” (Esposito, 2011, p. 207). Hegel’s claim about the essential 
and absolute object as "I" is therefore included in a biopolitical theory of sub­
jection and, to put it in Foucauldian terms, subjectification, as a transition 
from activity to passivity, embodiment and pure rationality, from lordship 
to bondage, subiectus to subiectum.
2 For colonial sources of Hegel’s theory cf. (Buck­Morss, 2000, pp. 821–865).
Page 13 of 26
Leo Rafolt Queer Immanence in Who is? Woyzeck: The Technocentric Utopia of the Master…
The figure of Woyzeck is perceived only as a body, pure embodiment, 
an experiment, and he is not even able to activate the emancipation process 
“from the corporeal substrate that indisputably makes the body the property of 
the person who inhabits it” (Esposito, 2011, p. 211). He is being a body, not having 
it, which brings me back to a biopolitical toolness or instrumentalization of slaves 
that is already depicted in biopolitical philosophical thought. The amplifica­
tion of a paradoxical form of the slave’s existence, already underlined by Hegel, 
ought to be appropriated in a discourse of biopolitics, like in Esposito’s case: 
“Once again, the apparatus of personhood reveals itself as a terrible thing that, 
separating life from itself, can always push it into a zone of indistinction with 
its opposite” (Esposito, 2011, p. 212). In his 1901 essay about the psychopathol­
ogy of everyday life, Sigmund Freud analyses a problem of forgetting names, 
finally leading to total memory loss, especially memory of the proper nouns. 
This leads him to a conclusion that personhood formation is deeply indebted 
to a link between identity and alterity, the all­encompassing "I" and the other­
ness in constant relation. Esposito quotes the following paragraph by Freud: 
“It is as if I were obliged to compare everything I hear about other people with 
myself; as if my personal complexes were put on alert whenever another per­
son is brought into my notice” (Freud, 1966, p. 24, in Esposito, 2011, p. 214). 
This antipodal formation of a person, whether in Freud or Esposito, at least 
in my opinion ought to be reflected upon in the context of Hegel’s notion of 
constant interdependency between the master and slave’s self­consciousness. 
Furthermore, this problem emerges in Montažstroj’s production as well, as I will 
try to show later on, already in the modification of Büchner’s original title to 
Who is? Woyzeck, whereby the question of the name and the problem of being 
("is") get its utmost importance. Woyzeck, as a protagonist, is always in a posi­
tion of a non­person, in constant relation to the third­person’s activity, whether 
these are military physicians or staff. This radical criticism of the institution of 
personhood deliberately ends up in negative biopolitics, where life is not to be 
sacrificed but, previously subdued to power, deprived, and finally eliminated 
as such. Experiment and military obedience, according to Büchner’s plot, will 
become the most direct and the most powerful interlocutors of one’s body, 
regulating birth, sexuality, nutrition and health (Woyzeck is fed only peas 
as an embodied experiment), and death as well. A new form of biopolitical 
bondage emerges, exemplified in the following fragment form Büchner, where 
the Doctor disciplines the protagonist after seeing him urinating on the street, 
clearly, only because of pure experimental reasons – a waist of urine:
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Let it call! Haven’t I proved that the musculus constrictor vesicae is subject to the will? 
Nature indeed. Man is free. Man is the transfiguration of the individual urge to 
freedom. Can’t hold his water. [Shakes his head, puts his hands behind his back and 
walks up and down.] Have you eaten your peas, Woyzeck? Nothing but peas, cru-
ciferae, remember. There is going to be a revolution in science, I’ll blow the whole 
thing sky­high. Uric acid 0.10, ammonium hydrochlorate, hyperoxide. – Woyzeck, 
can’t you have another piss? Go inside and try (Büchner, 2008, p. 115).
III
Not oversimplifying Hegel’s master­slave dialectics, which is not easy, 
Alain Badiou tries to re­establish a perfectly valid tristinction between what 
he is to call
a simple object in the world, a thing of the world which must be absolutely analyzed 
as any other thing. It is a body, a package of organs, a set of cells, finally a package 
of atoms, and ultimately a senseless movement of a billion of particles. This is what 
Hegel calls the in-itself. Secondly, one can regard the individual as knowing itself, 
not simply as known thing, but as having the reflective capacity to know itself and 
consequently as being what Hegel calls a ‘self­consciousness’. The individual exists 
in­itself but also for-itself, that is to say in an effective relation to itself. And then, 
thirdly, one can consider that this individual [in­itself] exists as an individual that 
can be recognized as the individual that it is by an other, particularly by an other 
individual. This is the figure of the other, that Sartre will call for-other. On an elemen­
tary descriptive level one very nicely finds again the Hegelian triplicity of in­itself, 
for itself and for the other" (Badiou, 2017, p. 37).
But, in order for the self­consciousness to be established, as well as in 
order for the individual to exist, it needs to be recognized. A typical Hegelian 
asymmetry arises: the master is put on the side of enjoyment, while the slave 
thus inhabits a vague area of labor. The thing that strikes me here the most, 
somewhere in the middle of Alain Badiou’s argument, is the fact that he desta­
bilizes the Hegelian dialectic even more, merely by introducing the concept of 
double(ness) or the usage of a twin:
We are thus in a logic of the double, a logic which has had many consequences, 
particularly aesthetic ones (the use of the twin; the fascinating theme of the dou­
bling, of the double). But the double is a symmetry, a symmetrical identity. If I stay 
with the double, nothing is produced: it is a closed and static structure, since we 
have a primitive reciprocity where everyone recognizes the other as it is recognized 
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by the other. We are apparently in an impasse of the dialectical process which seems 
to have stagnated in this primitive reciprocity" (Badiou, 2017, p. 39).
He concludes his commentary on Hegel with the following hypoth­
esis, which is substantial for my analysis of the Woyzeck performance: first, 
the master is able to recognize self­consciousness at the expense of life, to put 
it in biopolitical terms, accepting the risk of death; second, at the same time, 
the slave is eager to abandon the principle of self­recognition in order to pre­
serve his life; and finally, the third hypothesis asks for the extrinsic approach, 
where the master, faced with death, renounces the immediacy of life but 
in order to fall in the immediacy of enjoyment is enchained to a thing whose 
true master is the slave. To put it in other words:
In this sense the master becomes the slave of the slave. On his side, the slave has 
on the contrary accepted, out of fear of death, the primacy of immediate survival. 
But forced to work and accept the mediation of labor, he has created culture, becom­
ing in this way a future master of the master. In the incapacity to live otherwise than 
in the present, the master becomes the slave of the slave, in turn, the slave devoted 
to the future becomes the master of the master (Badiou, 2017, p. 41).
Having in mind that Montažstroj’s performance employs two male charac­
ters that function both as twins and antipodes, it is important not only to put 
them in Badiou’s doubleness paradigm or, furthermore, in a Hegelian matrix 
of bondage, but also to depict them as uncanny and queer. Homoerotic latency 
is of utmost importance for the group’s vision of the play, whether in explicit 
nakedness and physicality or actual contact between performers. The subject 
in the play, as well as in the performance, is produced at the same time as 
its object, being at the border of transcendence. Woyzeck’s consciousness is, 
therefore, not split, but it actually is a one and only true life­consciousness. 
To put it differently: “We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and 
nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in noth­
ing is itself a life” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 27). The twin figure of Woyzeck on 
the stage is a symptom of this pure immanence because it does not strive for 
individuality, but – in its uncanniness and queerness – it even opens a space 
for singularization. Following Deleuze: “For example, very small children 
all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality, but they have 
singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face – not subjective qualities. Small 
children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an 
immanent life that is pure power and even bliss” (Deleuze, 2002, p. 30). In 
a way, Montažstroj’s Woyzeck is uncanny, childishly singular, and queer at 
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the same time. Of course, this doesn’t mean that some of these features are not 
to be found in the performance’s prototext, Büchner’s play, but Montažstroj 
definitely insisted on this kind of semantics. Notions of singularity, uncanni­
ness and queerness in Who is? Woyzeck are interrelated to those of “becoming 
a subject” and “dealing with death”. Within the Hegelian paradigm, human 
death is a result of voluntary playfulness
of risk consciously assumed by the subject […] In other words, the human being truly 
becomes a subject – that is, separated from the animal – in the struggle and the work 
through which he or she confronts death (understood as violence of negativity) […] 
Becoming subject therefore supposes upholding the work of death. To uphold the work 
of death is precisely how Hegel defines the life of the Spirit" (Mbembé, 2003, p. 14).
Mbembé has offered a definition of death as a certain excess, an anti­
economy of life where biopower takes control, and, in a colonial way, where 
the emancipation process is precisely a process of de­shadowing the slave’s 
existence. Again, a certain desire is activated, but, as the author emphasizes, 
in a key of necropolitics rather than politics of life. All aspects of master­slave 
dialectics, as underlined by Butler, offer a kind of regard to desire. Desire in 
Hegel’s oeuvre is canceled yet preserved, transformed in a different mode of 
human striving. Self­consciousness is desire in particular, and even labor is 
inhibited desire:
The initial encounter with the Other is thus a narcissistic project which fails through 
an inability to recognize the Other’s freedom […] Thus, insofar as it is the body of 
the Other that is seen to lay claim to freedom, it is that body that must be destroyed. 
Only through the death of the Other will the initial self­consciousness retrieve its 
claim to autonomy (Butler, 1999, p. 49).
The life and death struggle, combat between violence and existence, 
is crucial in Hegel’s thought. The dynamics of mastery and servitude emerges 
exactly from the concept of desire, in all its uncanniness, singularity or queer­
ness – domination on one hand and total submission on the other:
The lord and the bondsman turn against life in different ways, but both resist 
the synthesis of corporeality and freedom, a synthesis that alone is constitutive of 
human life; the lord lives in dread of his body, while the bondsman lives in dread 
of freedom" (Butler, 1999, p. 55).
Woyzeck’s desire, expressed only through servitude and labor in Büchner’s 
play, transforms itself through the twin­like structure of Who is? Woyzeck, 
both through jouissance and labor. Desire directs itself to another desire, thus 
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trembling somewhere between sadism and masochism, creation and delinea­
tion of self­consciousness. Desire is both a productive and generative force 
that needs to be deconstructed not as a lack (manque), like in Judeo­Christian 
ideology, but as normative ideal, as affirmative (productive) power, or, to put 
it simply in Deleuze and Guattari’s biopolitical terms – life­affirming indeed. 
In other words: “Because distinction is no longer understood as a prerequisite 
for identity, otherness no longer presents itself as that to be ‘labored upon’, 
superseded or conceptualized” (Butler, 1999, p. 209).
Relying upon Deleuze and Guattari’s teleology, life­affirming desire, sus­
pended by capitalism and psychoanalytic ideology, opens up in all its queer­
ness in the performance of the Woyzeck­project, so the protagonist is being 
liberated not through his will­to­live but through his desire­to­live. The twin­
structure of the performance, its uncanny doubleness, simulates a sadomas­
ochistic relation, where everything is open as a perpetual novelty and a tension 
of uncertainty substitute an illusion of determinacy and finitude. This is why 
Agamben implies that such a community of life is so pre­juridical, that it often 
demands a more stable definition of the master­slave relationship,
almost as if otherwise they would slide into a confusion and a kononia tes zoes that 
the juridical order cannot admit except in the striking and despotic intimacy between 
master and slave. And what seems so scandalous to us moderns – namely, property 
rights over persons – could in fact be the originary form of property, the capture 
(the ex-ceptio) of the use of bodies in the juridical order (Agamben, 2016, p. 36).
Although in Hegel’s oeuvre bodies are rarely subjected to philosophical or 
theoretical speculation, most of his other categories, like those of desire, death, 
life, or enjoyment and labor, reflect upon bodily issues. Slave’s labor ought to be 
defined as a process of perpetual marking and unmarking, signing and re­a­signing 
objects of his labor. The signature that he puts on the object’s body is immediately 
expropriated by a lord, even erased, re­signified, in a constant, circular process. 
Woyzeck’s identity, therefore, is precisely a palimpsest­one; it is a product of an 
ownership, power strategy, a being that is “produced through a set of consequen­
tial erasures […] The bondsman’s fear then consists in the experience of having 
what appears to be his property expropriated” (Butler, 1997, pp. 39–40). This has 
many effects on the embodied structure of the slave, the bondsman. First, this 
emblematized laboring device is recast and subject to death. Second, absolute 
fear of death is thus replaced by absolute law, as is so clear in Woyzeck’s case. 
He is always subjected to different law­paradigms, all metaphors of death, and he 
is not even able to interpret them in a coherent way. He is trapped in a constant 
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circle of animal­like procedures – instead of the Hegelian defecation, constant 
demand for urination appears “as an object of self­preoccupation” (Butler, 1997, 
p. 50), leading to final wretchedness. As in the case of imprisonment, in Foucault, 
where the prison acts on the subject’s body as a norm of behavior – a model for 
an exemplary self­obedience – in Woyzeck’s case medical experiments function 
as rendering devices for a coherent appropriation and subjection of the protago­
nist’s individuality (Foucault’s assujettissement). Power acts not only intrinsi­
cally in the body but also on the body, extrinsically, where “his subject appears at 
the expense of the body, [which is] an appearance conditioned in inverse relation 
to the disappearance of the body” (Butler, 1997, pp. 91–92). Woyzeck’s death is, 
therefore, constantly being postponed. He is being more and more present in 
the play, which is of course (over)amplified in Montažstroj’s performance. Some 
of the most important topoi of his bodily presence include strategies of autoeroti­
cism, physical or mental exhaustion, ritualistic and almost incoherent stage pres­
ence, biomechanics, self­mutilation, etc. Although in Hegel the notion of body is 
not so persistent, it is implicitly present in his definition of form, which is again 
interconnected with desire, life, immanence, death, and two consciousnesses. 
Sois mon corps, which is the master’s injunction to the slave, opens a space for 
the post­humanist anthropology of the body. Malabou and Butler, among oth­
ers, focus precisely on the impossibility of actualizing this sort of injunction in 
a form of separation of subjectivity from the body. Complete detachment from 
the body is just as impossible and unavoidable as pure animality, or pure zoe, 
and this is why consciousness ought to be perceived in a new way in the context 
of plasticity, as being shaped and simultaneously shaping, and performativity, 
as being constraint and in action at once (Butler & Malabou, 2010, pp. 85–97, 
97–126). Woyzeck’s performative presence finally opens a space for one more 
interpretation, that of his implicit queerness. Nevertheless, this notion should 
be comprehended in a broader sense as some kind of general subversion of iden­
tity. It can be easily linked to the globalizing culture of postmodernism, human 
rights, ecology, etc. Its potential for semantical transformation and political usage 
seems “mostly specific to a cultural context that has not been brought into focus 
in the theory of queerness” (Warner, 2005, p. 209). Woyzeck’s queerness, in my 
opinion, should be defined as pure utopism because it ends up being a performa­
tive. Referring to Bloch’s notion of hope and Agamben’s potentiality as a certain 
mode of nonbeing that is eminent, or as a non­existing presence, José Esteban 
Muñoz defines queerness as something on the horizon, a thing that is not yet 
imagined – so it cannot be historicized:
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Queerness as utopian formation is a formation based on an economy of desire and 
desiring. This desire is always directed at that thing that is not yet here, objects 
and moments that burn with anticipation and promise […], born of the no­longer­
conscious, the rich resonance of remembrance, distinct pleasures felt in the past. 
And thus past pleasures stave off the affective perils of the present while they enable 
a desire that is queer futurity’s core" (Muñoz, 2009, p. 26).
Queer futurity relies upon desire in a similar way to Hegel’s conscious­
ness. Montažstroj’s Woyzeck functions in this assertive yet traceable desire, 
directed to some distant utopism and a better world. Indeed, Montažstroj’s 
performers are moving in a phantasm­like world, overwhelmed by rhythm, 
motion, embodiment and strong musical matrixes. They are negotiating their 
way through being an experiment and existing like an experiment – Muñoz 
would say, as identities-in-difference. Therefore,
disidentification is meant to be descriptive of the survival strategies the minority subject 
practices in order to negotiate a phobic majoritarian public sphere that continuously 
elides or punishes the existence of subjects who do not conform to the phantasm of 
normative citizenship […] The fiction of identity is one that is accessed with relative ease 
by most majoritarian subjects. Minoritarian subjects need to interface with different 
subcultural fields to activate their own senses of self […] Throughout this book, I refer to 
disidentification as a hermeneutic, a process of production, and a mode of performance. 
Disidentification can be understood as a way of shuffling back and forth between recep­
tion and production. For the critic, disidentification is the hermeneutical performance of 
decoding mass, high, or any other cultural field from the perspective of a minority subject 
who is disempowered in such a representational hierarchy" (Muñoz, 1999, pp. 4–5, 25).
When they are faced with a regime­narrative, a fiction of the system, they 
do not confront it and do not obey it either – they choose to disidentify it, 
purely existing inside of its hegemonic paradoxes. Büchner chose two extremely 
strong narratives to represent this regime – a military narrative on one hand 
and an experimental one, medical, on the other. In­between lies, once again, 
anti­economy of life, this time (re)presented with a Jewish character, addressing 
the protagonist. After claiming that the gun’s too dear, Woyzeck will choose 
a knife instead. The Jewish salesman describes it in the following way:
Lovely and straight it is. You want to cut your throat with it? – So what’s the matter? I give 
it to you as cheap as anybody else. Cheap you can have your death, but not for nothing. 
What’s the matter? You’ll have your death all right, very economical" (Büchner, 2008, p. 126).
Woyzeck will have an economical death, indeed a performative one, at the pond, 
where past and present interwove, and there is only a regard to utopian future. 
His potential death will, therefore, open a new area of queerness.
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IV
Montažstroj’s Who is? Woyzeck was first performed in 2002 in a bilingual 
mode; Büchner’s intertext was performed in German and different loosely asso­
ciated hypertexts were dramaturgically interconnected with the original and co­
performed in English. The play did not follow any given narrative because the group 
wanted to deconstruct the play, inter­layering it with different replies and music 
samples. Thus, the physical and intertextual or hypertextual samples were totally 
free of a character’s connection to a specific performer’s body. Montažstroj was 
eager to define this project, which was produced together with Performingunit, as 
an audio­project or concert­performance because all of its sections became a part 
of a central musical composition, emphasized by the frenetic use of a trance and 
techno musical background. The performance opens with hypertexts projected 
from the screen and two performers – rhythmically united – playing drums on 
each other’s behinds. Their vocal expression is subordinated to music or, to be more 
precise, to the rhythmic beat coming from their performative environment. Even 
their speech, which ought to be their main expressive mode, at least as logocentric 
theatre imposes, is projected to a stereo­microphonic device. This creates an inter­
esting performance uncanniness where sharing a microphone denotes paratextual 
interferences between actual characters in Büchner’s play, mainly Woyzeck and 
the others, or commentaries of the play, often projected from the vague and neutral 
standpoint of the extra­performative instance. Moreover, Who is? Woyzeck acti­
vates an extremely potent mode of community of life, a specific twin­structure of 
speech, physicality, expression, gestures or embodiment on the stage. Everything 
in Montažstroj’s performance is amplified, doubled, communized, either by hyper­
textual or co­textual interferences, physical resemblances of the performers, their 
constant interfering gestus, or by their roleplay economy as such, whereby they tend 
to imitate each other’s movements, performative scenarios, etc. Their twinness 
also induces them in a triple existence, each delimitated by a specific différance. 
At first glance they act in a supplementary matrix where each performer, male 
or female – never mind – is organically dependent on the other’s co­presence. Even 
the zero­ground for this mutual arche­performance – embodied in a microphone 
sharing and holding principle – underlines this matrix. Secondly, they act inside 
of a specific dialectic mechanism, often trying to eliminate one another, either by 
violence, master and slave resonance, or by hypertextual annulation of the primary 
intertext, Georg Büchner’s play. And finally, they constantly reproduce a certain 
contrapuntal existence, usually by being engaged in a kind of sadomasochistic 
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desire, craving for each other, punishing each other, subduing and oppressing 
each other, thus constantly re­economizing the lordship and bondage semantics. 
The stable position in this performative structure is not possible, not being wel­
come as well. Microphone, as the only omnipresent prop on the stage, functions 
not only as a voice­resonance machine, as an amplifier of the performers’ speech, 
but also as an amplifier of desire, projected from one performer enrolled in a slave­
like position to another, a sublimation of the mastery, or lordship, and vice versa. 
Therefore, pure labor is present on the stage, indirect production, production of 
the production, which nevertheless in a machine­like way produces or invigorates 
itself, like in the body­without­organs paradigm. To put it in other words:
The body without organs now falls back on (se rabat sur) desiring­production, attracts 
it, and appropriates it for its own. The organ­machines now cling to the body without 
organs as though it were a fencer’s padded jacket, or as though these organ­machines 
were medals pinned onto the jersey of a wrestler who makes them jingle as he starts 
toward his opponent. An attraction­machine now takes the place, or may take 
the place, of a repulsion­machine: a miraculating machine succeeding the paranoiac 
machine […] The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable [sic!], 
serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire, so 
that desiring­machines seem to emanate from it in the apparent objective movement 
that establishes relationship between the machines and the body without organs" 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, pp. 22–23).
Interconnection between the primary and the secondary text in Montažstroj’s 
performance appears to be – in a Deleuzean sense – metaproductive, implying 
the relationship that transcends the one between constatives and didaskalia. 
The performance’s hypertext, for example, accompanying Büchner’s German 
original in English, is structured in a pseudo­formulaic way, as a simple affirma­
tive statement starting with a protagonist’s name. The audience is confronted 
with a mechanism that resembles a recording, whereby “similarly, recording 
is followed by consumption, but the production of consumption is produced 
in and through the production of recording” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 28). 
This is precisely because the subject is estranged, without any fixed or pure eas­
ily definable identity, which is always left aside, somehow peripheral to desire, 
labor, or both at the same time. Montažstroj’s performative subject, Woyzeck, 
the one on the stage, split in a twin­structure, ought to be defined somewhere 
between repression and repulsion, which is again in total accordance with/to 
Hegel’s notions of master and slave consciousness. They are constantly and 
mutually constraining and, at the same time, producing each other’s jouissance, 
for example – biting each other, hitting each other, or tying their own genitals 
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with a microphone cord, as though being totally aware of the self­castrating 
power of logocentrism. Their queerness, as a disidentification paradigm, should 
be interpreted more in the light of centrifugalism of repression­ and repulsion­
desiring mechanisms than pure sadomasochism.
If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive 
only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syn-
theses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of 
production. The real is the end product" (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 39).
Everything that is produced by the production itself in this performance, 
that is, everything in this repression and repulsion dispositive, functions 
as a resonance mechanism in a multilayered stage­process. This process 
begins with pure amplification of the performers’ voices in a microphonic 
stereo­resonance, followed by its sadomasochistic usage in the tying one’s 
own genitals scene, and, later on, in an oral sex scene, where the microphone 
will be employed as a sexual organ, thus creating cacophony and resonance 
while being repeatedly inserted in the performers’ mouths. Finally, it will 
become a murder weapon as well. The uncanniness of these procedures 
does not function as a consequence of dramaturgical device but as a meta­
phor of the hegemonic oppression in its purest or strongest form, with its 
enormous effect on desiring production. Even the audience is not keen to 
interpret these acts as fantasy expressions, but, exactly the opposite, they 
seem to acknowledge that
desiring­machines are not fantasy­machines or dream­machines, which suppos­
edly can be distinguished from [ideological and hegemonic] technical and social 
machines. Rather, fantasies are secondary expressions, deriving from the identical 
nature of the two sorts of machines in any given set of circumstances. Thus fantasy 
is never individual; it is group fantasy (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 43).
The biopolitical ambition of Montažstroj’s performance inspired by Woyzeck 
is clear enough. I have tried to underline the bio­powerlessness of its protagonists 
by engaging in an analysis and theoretical research of the master­slave dialectics, 
as well as its resonances in modern philosophical thought. Everything resonates 
and amplifies itself in this play, but in the performance’s texture as well, indeed. 
These resonances are not kept secret in front of the audience. They are drama­
turgically pre­given, that is, they are constantly being excerpted from Woyzeck 
and inserted in the performance’s stratum, on all its levels of production. Let 
me finish this analysis of Montažstroj’s performance by alluding to another, 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s performative resonance. In Anti-Oedipus, discussing 
the partial metaphysics of the contemporary human, which is fragmented 
and/or dispersed, the authors insist upon the inclusion of desire­mechanisms 
in the economic and political spheres, whereby the economy of desire often 
symptomatizes its own repression (Deleuze & Guattari, 2015, p. 126–129). 
Thus, what confronts Woyzeck’s desire in Montažstroj’s performance is not 
ideology or a certain hegemony matrix, at least not only that, but something 
well beneath it, what the authors call an unconscious investment. Precisely 
because of this kind of investment, moreover, the performers on the stage 
function in a conjunctive synthesis (Deleuze & Guattari) or in a community 
of life (Agamben) which is beyond any pre­given political structure: while on 
the stage they seem queer, uncanny and/or sometimes even frantic, but in their 
own way they emanate every possible rupture – in­between the individual, 
a desiring­machine, an incomplete consciousness, on one hand, and the sub­
jugation matrixes of medical experiments on bare life, that of technology and 
science, on the other.
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Immanencja queer w Who is? Woyzeck. 
Technocentryczna utopia „pana i niewolnika”
Who is? Woyzeck autorstwa grupy Montažstroj to performatywna opowieść o otwar­
tych ranach jednostek, które prawdopodobnie nigdy się nie zagoją, szczególnie ze względu na 
procesy technodemokracji i liberalnej deprywacji. Woyzeck, którego głos jest niesłyszalny, to 
bohater dramatu Georga Büchnera – jest ograbiony, odarty z praw, a jego zachowanie/praca są 
społecznie nieakceptowane. Woyzeck jest pozbawiony cech ludzkich, zamieniony w zwierzę, 
czyste zoe, a co za tym idzie jest traktowany przez system jak zwierzę.
Page 25 of 26
Leo Rafolt Queer Immanence in Who is? Woyzeck: The Technocentric Utopia of the Master…
Celem omawianego projektu grupy Montažstroj było zbadanie polityki władzy, w któ­
rej jednostka jest poddana licznym formom przemocy, a także sposobów, w jakie te akty 
przemocy rezonują na powierzchni ludzkiej intymności. Rytmiczna zmiana scen ilustruje 
społeczny przymus i prywatną agonię, sztuka bada świat zamieszkany przez wyizolowane 
i samotne jednostki. Woyzeck został zaprezentowany jako czyste zjawisko, jednostka uwię­
ziona w Heglowskiej relacji „pana i niewolnika”, a więc jako nie­osoba, której ciało jest 
zawłaszczane i używane w konkretnej sytuacji przemocy, miłości, zdrady, zazdrości i mor­
derstwa, bez możliwości ucieczki. Performans dwóch mężczyzn i kobiety na scenie, który ma 
prezentować specyficzną wspólnotę życia, bombardowany muzyką techno i rave, wzbogacony 
czystymi strumieniami skojarzeń wywodzącymi się z różnych źródeł (przede wszystkim 
z napisanego w 1936 roku tekstu Georga Büchnera), jest analizowany jako dekonstrukcyjna 
i wielowarstwowa re­inskrypcja politycznych i dyskursywnych reżimów podporządkowanych 
frenetycznym próbkom muzycznym.
Słowa kluczowe: biopolityka, wspólnota życia, dialektyka pana i niewolnika, ciało, podmiot
Queer immanence in Who is? Woyzeck: 
The technocentric utopia of the master and the slave
Montažstroj’s Who is? Woyzeck is a performative history about individuals’ open wounds 
that will probably never heal, especially in the context of technodemocracy and liberal depri­
vation processes. Woyzeck is a Georg Büchner hero whose voice is not able to be heard. He is 
deprived, deprivileged, and his behavior/labor is socially unacceptable. He is devoid of human­
ity, turned into an animal, pure zoe, and thus treated like one by the system.
Montažstroj’s project was, therefore, eager to explore the politics of power where the indi­
vidual is subdued to numerous forms of violence and the way these violent acts resonate on 
the surface of human intimacy. The rhythmic changing of scenes depicted social coercion 
and private agony; the play questioned the world of isolated and lonely individuals. Woyzeck 
was presented as a pure phenomenon, as an in-dividual trapped in a Hegelian master­slave 
relation, thus as a non­person whose body is being occupied and used in a specific situation 
of violence, love, betrayal, jealousy and murder, with no way out. The performance of two 
men and a woman on a stage, which is supposed to function as a specific community of life, 
bombarded with techno and rave music, together with pure channels of associations derived 
from various sources, primarily from Büchner's text, which was written in 1836, is thus ana­
lyzed as a deconstructive and multi­layered re­inscription of political and discursive regimes 
subdued by frenetic music samples.
Keywords: biopolitics, community of life, master­slave dialectics, body, subject
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